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WHY IS AN EGG DONOR A GENETIC PARENT,  
BUT NOT A MITOCHONDRIAL DONOR?* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Great Britain recently became the first country in the world to allow the 
creation of so-called “three-parent babies.” 1  The controversial reproductive 
procedures that allow for such a possibility replace a mother’s disease-linked 
mitochondrial DNA with that of another, healthy woman. The result is a child 
with three genetic contributors: one male and two female. Rather curiously, 
however, the mitochondrial donor is required to acknowledge, by consent, that 
she will not be the child’s genetic parent.2 Similarly, when the UK-based Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics conducted an inquiry into the ethical issues raised by 
mitochondrial donation, it concluded that, “[this type of] donation does not 
indicate, either biologically or legally, any notion of the child having either a 
‘third parent,’ or ‘second mother’.”3 But why such emphasis? Why worry about 
third parents and second mothers? These issues arise in the case of mitochondrial 
donation because there is nothing about the way biologists characterize 
reproduction—as a process by which organisms generate new individuals of the 
same kind—that would exclude the donor from being a third genetic parent. 
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What’s the basis, then, for considering an egg donor a genetic parent but not a 
mitochondrial donor? I will argue that a closer look at the biological facts will not 
give us an answer to this question because the process by which one becomes a 
genetic parent, i.e., the process of reproduction, is not a concept that can be settled 
by looking. It is, rather, a concept in need of philosophical attention.  
 The details of my argument will rest on recent developments in biological 
technology, but the persuasiveness of my argument will turn on the history of 
another biological concept, death. Given some important similarities between the 
two concepts, the way in which ‘death’ evolved in the recent past can provide 
guidance on how we should think about ‘reproduction.’ The paper will unfold in 
three stages: first, I will provide an account of how technological advancements 
muddled the seemingly biological concept of death in a way that prevented us 
from resolving it by empirical means; second, I will show that something similar 
is currently happening to the concept of reproduction; finally, I will argue that, as 
with death, there are important practical issues hinging on a more rigorous 
understanding of reproduction. Although much of what I say in this paper 
suggests that we need a new concept of reproduction, I do not offer one here. My 
aim is simply to show why ‘reproduction,’ a seemingly biological concept, is in 
need of philosophical analysis.4 
 
DEATH 
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Prior to the invention of the mechanical ventilator, death in the United 
States was determined by looking, not thinking. To tell if someone had died, all 
one had to do was check basic vital signs, e.g., pulse and breathing. Since the 
heart, the lungs, and the brain all work together, the cessation of any one would 
soon stop the other two and result in death. The widespread dissemination of 
ventilators in the 1960s (along with artificial nutrition and hydration) changed all 
that. Suddenly, an individual’s lungs and heart could continue to function even 
though the brain, and all the cognitive functions regulated by the brain, had 
ceased.  
This possibility raised a new question: Should a person with a 
nonfunctioning brain, but with mechanically sustained cardiopulmonary 
functions, be considered dead or alive? In 1968, the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee 
responded to this question by contending that such a person ought to be 
considered dead.5 However, the philosophical justification as to why wasn’t 
published until more than a decade after the committee’s decision. In 1981, the 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research wrote:   
 
[D]eath is that moment at which the body’s physiological system 
ceases to constitute an integrated whole. Even if life continues in 
individual cells or organs, life of the organism as a whole requires 
complex integration, and without the latter, a person cannot 
properly be regarded as alive.6 
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Since the brain’s functioning is necessary for the integration of the other functions 
of the human organism, and death is the irreversible loss of the functioning of the 
organism as a whole, the brain’s destruction constitutes death. In their report, the 
President’s Commission acknowledges that it was the invention of the ventilator 
that forced the medical community to think about death separately from its 
symptoms.7 Keeping the two apart helped clarify that death is, and always has 
been, the irreversible cessation of an organism’s integrated functions, and the 
irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary functions was merely an indicator of 
death. 
 The definition of death put forth by the President’s Commission is used in 
ethical and legal practice, but some philosophers have rejected the idea that death 
requires the cessation of the brain’s functioning as a whole. Jeff McMahan, for 
example, has argued that for the whole-brain conception of death to be right, it 
must be the case that we are merely organisms, an assumption that shouldn’t be 
taken for granted. He writes: 
 
Whether we are organisms is not a scientific question. There is no 
experiment that can be done to determine whether or not we are 
organisms, just as there is no experiment that could tell us whether 
a statue and the lump of bronze of which it is composed are one 
and the same thing or distinct substances. These are both 
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metaphysical questions that must be settled by philosophical 
argument.8 
 
McMahan argues that only if we assume we are merely organisms can we accept 
the whole-brain definition of death. But if we assume we are persons, in addition 
to biological organisms, we may cease to exist before the brain ceases functioning 
as a whole. In other words, we can die before the organism we are is dead.  
On the higher-brain conception of death, which McMahan supports, we 
die when we irreversibly lose the capacity for consciousness, when there is no 
longer anything it is like to be the persons we are. That moment comes with the 
permanent loss of consciousness. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the whole 
brain to stop functioning in order for death to occur. The lower brain may 
continue to function, but if the higher brain no longer works the person is rightly 
considered dead.  
 Not surprisingly, James Bernat and colleagues (who were among the first 
to provide the philosophical justification for whole-brain death) have rejected the 
higher-brain conception and with it the idea that death is synonymous with the 
death of a person, “The concept ‘person’ is not biological but rather a concept 
defined in terms of certain kinds of abilities and qualities of awareness…Death is 
a biological concept.”9 According to Bernat et al., if we want to define what it 
means for a person to die, such a conception of death is not sufficiently general. 
Death does not pertain only to persons but to all living things, and since the focus 
on higher-brain death is narrowly construed to apply only to creatures capable of 
Forthcoming	in	The	Cambridge	Quarterly	of	Healthcare	Ethics	 	 		
	 6	
consciousness, it is a definition that is not well suited to account for the general 
biological phenomena associated with death.  
 Philosophers continue to debate whether death is the irreversible cessation 
of integrated functions of an organism or the irreversible loss of consciousness. 
That’s because no scientific experiment can determine the extension of the 
concept. Again, in the words of the President’s Commission, “The basic concept 
of death is fundamentally a philosophical matter.”10 But, of course, there are 
important practical consequences that hinge on an account of ‘death.’ For 
example, many of our legal statutes make use of the concept: criminal, tort, 
family, property and estate inheritance, insurance, and tax laws all require a clear 
conception of death. Moreover, how we define death can determine when it is 
permissible to remove someone’s organs for donation. And, as a last example, 
depending on how death is defined, hospitals can refuse to take care of patients 
who can still grow, develop and give birth, claiming that they are nonetheless 
dead.11  
 
REPRODUCTION 
 
 We see, then, that technological innovations sometimes require us to 
rethink old concepts. When the ventilator became available, we had to reconceive 
a concept that in the past seemed obvious. But it is not as though this 
reconceptualization could be settled with additional empirical evidence. Even 
with full agreement on the empirical facts, ‘death’ is ambiguous. Consequently, 
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trying to understand the concept of death has become an important philosophical 
topic. Something similar is currently happening to the concept of reproduction. As 
new ways of reproducing emerge, advancing technologies are forcing us to 
rethink an old concept. 
 What are these new technologies that are posing problems for the concept 
of reproduction? Let us return to the example with which I began. Recall that 
there are controversial procedures currently being developed in Great Britain that 
would replace a mother’s disease-linked mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) with that 
of another, healthy woman. The replacement can be done using one of two 
methods: maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pro-nuclear transfer (PNT). The 
former method removes nuclear genetic material from an oocyte, the latter from a 
zygote. The nuclear genetic material is then transferred to an enucleated recipient 
cell (a cell without a nucleus), which contains all the remaining cellular structures, 
including healthy mitochondria. Both techniques—if working as intended—allow 
a woman with disease-linked mtDNA to have a child who will share her nuclear 
genetic material but not her defective mitochondrial genes. Instead, the child’s 
mtDNA will come from a female donor, and if the child is female, that donated 
mtDNA will be passed down to the next generation (assuming she has children).12  
 The Nuffield Council acknowledges that a child created using either MST 
or PNT would have three genetic contributors—one male and two female—but 
they don’t see this as a child with three biological parents. Why not? According to 
the report, there are a couple of reasons to believe that contributing mtDNA is not 
sufficient to result in a child with three biological parents. The first reason is that 
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mtDNA is not the right kind of DNA, and the second is that mtDNA comprises 
only a small fraction of overall DNA. Let’s examine each reason in turn. 
 Why think mtDNA is not the right kind of DNA? According to the 
Nuffield Council, the kind of DNA that might turn a donor into a biological 
parent is DNA that influences a child’s phenotypic characteristics. For example, if 
a donor’s mtDNA were to influence the child’s physical appearance or 
personality, she might rightly be considered the child’s “genetic parent.” But 
since mtDNA is primarily involved in the production of cellular energy, its 
replacement is often compared to the replacement of a battery: replacing a battery 
helps an appliance function, but it doesn’t affect the functioning of an appliance.13  
Similarly, healthy mtDNA helps a child develop but it doesn’t change the 
physical characteristics the child develops, which is why mitochondrial donors 
shouldn’t be viewed as a child’s genetic parents. In the following passage, the 
Nuffield Council seems to endorse this perspective:   
 
It is beyond the remit of this project to fully investigate the widely 
variable perceptions of parenthood as brought about by genetic 
connections (or the lack of them). However, it does seem apparent 
to the Working Group that mitochondrial donation could be 
difficult to fit into some of the aspects often thought of as denoting 
characteristics of (nuclear) genetic ‘parenthood’…For example, 
paternal and maternal nuclear genetic contributions create a child 
with a unique nuclear genome, reflecting various recognizable 
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aspects of these two genetic contributors. By contrast, it is 
discordant with current cultural conventions generated around 
(nuclear) genetic parenthood, that (as far as we are aware) 
mitochondrial genes convey to the resulting child no physical 
resemblances or other traits of personal characteristics of the 
donor, beyond that of health or ill-health.14  
 
 
The idea is that since mtDNA recipients lack any physical resemblance to their 
donors—except with respect to health or ill-health—and since there is an 
expectation of physical resemblance between genetic parents and their children, 
mtDNA recipients should not be considered the donors’ genetic children.  
This argument is problematic for a number of reasons. First, while it is 
true enough that offspring tend to resemble their parents, it’s not by resemblance 
that we determine whether two people are genetically related. I may share my 
biological mother’s eye color or sense of humor, but our shared similarities are 
not the reason I am her daughter. Of course, we’re likely to share such features 
because we stand in a certain biological relation to one another, but what that 
biological relation amounts to, i.e., what counts as reproduction, is exactly what’s 
at issue. To gesture at shared similarity without an account of the relation that 
justifies that gesture is to beg the question. My worry is that emphasizing 
resemblance when deciding whether mtDNA is the right kind of DNA to qualify 
the donor as a third genetic parent ignores the standard by which genetic parents 
qualify as genetic parents. 
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Second, the Nuffield Council’s report doesn’t offer a supporting argument 
for the idea that some genes, namely nuclear ones, convey traits of physical 
resemblance and some, namely mitochondrial ones, don’t. That’s not to say there 
isn’t another gesture at a reason for thinking nuclear genes play a role in physical 
resemblance not played by mitochondrial DNA, but again, the gesture is empty. 
Here is why. It is widely recognized that there are no “genes for” traits, for 
example, there are no “genes for” eye color. 15 Accordingly, to say that someone 
has a “gene for” blue eyes is the equivalent of saying that nuclear genes played 
some causal role in the development of that trait. However, given that 
mitochondrial genes also play some causal role in the development of traits—after 
all, they are the batteries necessary for developing physical characteristics—we 
cannot dismiss mitochondrial genes as causally insignificant in determining the 
traits of the offspring, at least not without an argument. Demoting the causal role 
of mtDNA while promoting that of nuclear DNA, when determining biological 
parentage, requires an account of causation that can explain why some types of 
causal relations are more significant than others. 
 Now that I’ve highlighted some problems with the first reason offered by 
the Nuffield Council for believing that mitochondrial donation doesn’t lead to 
genetic parenthood, let’s turn to the second. Recall that this reason relied on the 
fact that mtDNA comprises only a small fraction of overall DNA. But why would 
the fraction of contributed DNA matter? Or, more precisely, given that the 
fraction of DNA transferred between generations can vary significantly and not 
undermine parent/offspring relations, using the fraction of transferred DNA to 
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determine those relations doesn’t seem like the right move. Compare, for 
example, the amount of DNA passed from parent to offspring in two standard 
forms of reproduction: sexual and asexual. In asexual reproduction, the offspring 
inherits 100% of the DNA of its parent, but in sexual reproduction, that amount 
drops by half. The offspring of sexually reproducing parents inherits only half of a 
parent’s DNA, yet the process is still considered ‘reproductive’ in kind. Now, if 
the amount of DNA passed from parent to offspring can vary this dramatically 
and still count as reproduction, what prevents even smaller amounts of DNA 
transmission from being considered? What if we develop a method of replacing 
stretches of DNA constituting 30% of overall DNA, or 20%, or 40%? How much 
is enough for the reproductive process to involve three parents, rather than two? If 
there is no principled way of drawing a boundary between instances of DNA 
transmission that are large enough to fall within the boundaries of reproduction 
and ones that aren’t, then we need some other justification for denying that 
mitochondrial DNA transfers fall under the scope of the concept.  
 
A SPECTRUM OF CASES 
 
 The fact that members of the Nuffield Council felt compelled to question 
whether mitochondrial donors are genetic parents shows that mtDNA transfers are 
challenging the boundaries of reproduction. The challenge is to be expected. After 
all, parts merged during mitochondrial donation are at the same sub-cellular level 
as parts merged during traditional sexual and asexual reproduction. Maybe this 
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fact warranted the Council’s engagement with such a question, maybe not. Either 
way, the reasons offered for dismissing mtDNA transmission as insignificant 
compared to the transmission of nuclear DNA in determining genetic parenthood 
aren’t conclusive. And the problem is only going to get harder. It isn’t just 
subcellular transfers that raise problems for the concept of reproduction. 
Increasingly, transfers of biological material at the cellular level can also mimic 
reproduction, making this technological development a further problem for 
correctly identifying an individual’s genetic parents.   
When cellular instead of sub-cellular material is merged, the result is a 
chimera, i.e., a biological individual composed of cells derived from at least two 
different zygotes, which can be of either the same or different species. Let’s look 
at a few recent experiments to see how chimeras can raise problems for 
understanding the concept of reproduction. 
In March 2013, a team of researchers working at the University of 
Rochester in New York, isolated specific types of brain cells—called glial 
progenitors—from second trimester fetuses (obtained after abortion), and 
engrafted them into the brains of newborn mice.16 By the time these human-
mouse chimeras reached adulthood, a large portion of their glia were replaced by 
human glia. Afterwards, the team tested the chimeras to see if the engraftment had 
any impact on their abilities. To everyone’s surprise, they discovered that the 
chimeras performed better on various learning and memory tests than their 
entirely murine controls. For example, when trained to fear an innocuous tone by 
pairing it with foot shock, “the human glial chimeric mice exhibited a significant 
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enhancement in learning of the tone foot shock association: they showed greater 
fear to the tone as measured by scoring freezing behavior (the cessation of all 
movement except for respiration).”17 
Intrigued by these results, the team conducted another experiment the 
following year. This time, they transplanted more human glial progenitor cells 
into newborn mice to test whether the human cells could completely replace their 
murine counterparts. A year after the transplant, the cells of human origin 
completely replaced the host population, leading to “the effective humanization of 
the adult mouse with respect to its glial phenotypes.”18  
Both experiments are fascinating, but the question no one seemed to ask 
was whether the engraftment (and subsequent incorporation) of human glia in the 
mouse brain should count as an example of reproduction? But maybe such a 
suggestion is just too odd. Why would anyone think that transferring brain cells to 
neonatal mice would be a process that might fall under the purview of the concept 
‘reproduction’? Perhaps because these mice inherited body parts from both human 
beings and mice and, in at least the first experiment, those parts influenced their 
phenotypic traits. It is in virtue of the transfer that the human-mouse chimeras 
were able to learn quicker. But is that enough to make both the contributors of the 
mouse and the human parts biological parents? If not, why not? 
 Given that the glial cells were merged so late in the developmental process 
of the mice—on the day they were born—my guess is that most people would say 
that the genealogical history of the mouse was not altered as a result of the 
transfer. A proper mouse was already in existence when the experiment was 
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performed, making the engraftment look more like an organ transplant than an 
instance of reproduction. But I should emphasize that it only looks this way. It’s 
not clear what an argument to decide the issue would amount to. Intuitively, then, 
this is a case of transplantation rather than reproduction. However, the difference 
between transplantation and reproduction is not always this intuitive.   
Indeed, if cells are merged early enough in a creature’s development, the 
merged cells may have the effect of altering our intuitions about genealogical 
relations. As a demonstration of this point, consider an experiment that involved 
pushing three young rhesus monkey embryos together to form one aggregate 
embryo. The outcome was the birth of a rhesus monkey whose initial composition 
was the product of three different populations of cells, which contained the 
genetic material of six individuals. Although the merging of biological material 
was at the cellular level, as opposed to the subcellular level typical of both sexual 
and asexual reproduction, it would be hard to argue that the offspring did not bear 
a genealogical relation to all six individuals. Indeed, the headlines also announced 
the outcome as the birth of monkeys with six parents.19 
What do these examples mean for the concept of reproduction? It seems 
that at both the subcellular and cellular levels of material transfer, there is a 
spectrum of cases that may qualify as instances of reproduction. On one end of 
the spectrum are cases that are less like reproduction and more like 
transplantation, on the other are cases that are more like reproduction and less like 
transplantation. Between the ends of the spectrum are cases that do not fall neatly 
into either category and there are a variety of such examples. Hence, things like 
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gene therapy (a subcellular transfer) and kidney transplants (a cellular transfer) 
resemble transplantation; the merging of sperm and egg (a subcellular transfer) 
and the creation of rhesus monkey chimeras (a cellular transfer) resemble 
reproduction; mitochondrial transfers (a subcellular transfer) and the creation of 
human-mouse chimeras (a cellular transfer) fall somewhere in the middle. [Figure 
1 near here] As new cases make their appearance on the spectrum, we’ll need 
something more robust than mere intuitions to guide us. Biological facts can help 
us navigate the space, but they cannot determine why some processes should and 
others should not qualify as ‘reproduction.’ What’s needed is a philosophical 
argument, especially since matters of practical importance depend on it. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
 To illustrate the practical import of providing a defensible account of 
reproduction, I’m going to return to cases of mitochondrial donation. Although 
mtDNA transfers are just one example on the transplantation-reproduction 
spectrum, they have received the most public attention, and are thus well suited 
for thinking through the practical implications of understanding mitochondrial 
donation as ‘reproduction’ rather than ‘transplantation.’ 
To get started, it’s worth pointing out that if a mitochondrial donor were 
recognized as one of a recipient child’s genetic parents, she wouldn’t thereby 
become the child’s social/legal parent. Instead, her role would likely be analogous 
to that of an egg or sperm donor: an individual who is enabling another individual 
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(or a couple) to become a social/legal parent. As such, she would be the child’s 
genetic parent, but the intended parents would be the bearers of parental rights 
and responsibilities. As Josephine Johnston explains, third-party reproduction 
routinely separates the genetic/biological/gestational parents from the intended 
social/legal parents: 
 
[W]e have generally come to recognize the intended parents as the 
legal and social parents of any child born from donated gametes or 
embryos, and the donors are understood simply as donors, or as 
“genetic parents” or “biological parents” or—in the case of 
gestational surrogate—as the “gestating mother.” These terms are 
still somewhat problematic and contested—in part because we 
usually give so much responsibility to anybody identified as a 
parent—but it is fair to say that the legal system, the fertility 
industry, and much of society now recognize the social parents as 
the legitimate parents and release the donors and surrogates from 
any parental rights and responsibilities.20 
 
Applied to our current discussion, the suggestion is that even if mitochondrial 
donation were equivalent to gamete donation, the mtDNA donor would likely be 
released from any parental rights and responsibilities. In that sense, changing the 
status of the mitochondrial donor to a genetic parent wouldn’t make much 
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difference—either way, the intended parents, not the mtDNA donor, would bear 
all parental rights and responsibilities.  
 However, changing the status of the mitochondrial donor would result in 
changes to the consent procedure. According to the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) in the UK, in order to fully inform a donor’s 
decision (sperm, egg or mitochondria donor), the individual has to be given 
“enough information to enable them to understand the nature, purpose and 
implications of their treatment or donation.” 21  Currently, the nature of 
mitochondrial donation is not recognized as influencing reproduction. Although 
we haven’t seen any good reasons for believing that, there are consequences. For 
example, instructions for medical practitioners put forth by HFEA, which explain 
what’s required to get informed consent from a mitochondria donor, ask them to 
make sure that the patient understands that “the intended mother, not your patient, 
will be the genetic parent of any child that is born.”22 However, if mitochondrial 
donation were acknowledged to influence ‘reproduction,’ the nature of the 
donation would involve understanding that the donor is one of the child’s genetic 
parents. Informed consent could require a different set of criteria. 
Aside from differences in obtaining informed consent, there are other 
practical issues that arise for our understanding of reproduction. For example, in 
2005, egg and sperm donors (donating for purposes of reproduction through 
licensed clinics) became the only tissue and organ donors in the UK who are 
unable to donate anonymously.23 This means that at the age of 18, a donor-
conceived child can apply for identifying information about the donor and contact 
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the donor, as well as any donor-conceived siblings. Conversely, gamete donors 
can find out whether their donation resulted in children. HFEA provides the 
following reason for ending gamete-donor anonymity: 
 
Anonymity has been removed because it has been recognized by 
law that many donor-conceived people have a desire and interest in 
finding out about where they came from. Similarly, the interest 
donors have in finding out about children born from their donation 
has also been recognized.24  
 
Given HFEA’s explanation for the end of anonymity, it seems that the same 
reasons could apply to mtDNA donors if they are considered genetic parents. 
Indeed, if it turns out that mtDNA donors are genetic parents, losing their 
anonymity would help donor-conceived people find out where they came from. 
 One last point, although this one is not specific to mitochondrial donation. 
In the context of third-party reproduction, and assisted reproduction more broadly, 
it’s often taken for granted that one has a right to reproduce.25 But given the 
uncertainty of what counts as reproduction, and the possibility of someone 
inadvertently becoming a genetic parent, we might want to focus some attention 
on the question of whether we have a right not to reproduce.26 As we sign lengthy 
consent forms for medical procedures, we may want to know, and have a right to 
know, if any of our extracted parts will be used in a way that will turn us into 
genetic parents. After all, if there is a right not to reproduce, we should know 
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when that right is in danger of being violated. On a related note, we may have to 
decide whether aborted fetuses should be allowed to become genetic parents.27 As 
we saw in the glial cell experiments, cells are sometimes extracted from aborted 
fetuses and engrafted to nonhuman animals in an effort to study human cells in 
the context of a chimera. If such experiments were to count as instances of 
reproduction, the aborted fetuses would be the chimeras’ genetic parents. These 
concerns provide additional reasons for getting clear on exactly what we mean by 
‘reproduction.’  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Sometimes technological innovations inspire us to reexamine old 
concepts. Just like the invention of the ventilator helped us reimagine our concept 
of death, so too, our increasing ability to transfer biological parts within and 
across species is challenging our concept of reproduction. Appeals to sexual or 
asexual reproduction are of little use since new ways of merging parts no longer 
resemble the way biologists have traditionally characterized reproduction. As a 
result, dismissing something like mitochondrial donation as not an instance of 
reproduction is a challenge. Even some transfers at the cellular level are hard to 
place on the transplantation-reproduction spectrum. All of these difficulties 
suggest that the concept of reproduction is in need of philosophical analysis. In 
the 1960s, we faced a similar realization with respect to death and today almost 
every bioethics textbook has a discussion on the topic. But the same is not true of 
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‘reproduction,’ and my aim in this paper has been to argue that this needs to 
change.  
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